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Abstract
This paper argues that in the presence of intersectoral input-output linkages, mi-
croeconomic idiosyncratic shocks may lead to aggregate fluctuations. We show, as the
economy becomes more disaggregated, the rate at which aggregate volatility decays is
determined by the structure of the network capturing such linkages. Our main results
provide a characterization of this relationship in terms of the importance of different
sectors as suppliers to their immediate customers as well as their role as indirect sup-
pliers to chains of downstream sectors. Such higher-order interconnections capture the
possibility of “cascade effects” whereby productivity shocks to a sector propagate not
only to its immediate downstream customers, but also to the rest of the economy. Our
results highlight that sizable aggregate volatility is obtained from sectoral idiosyncratic
shocks only if there exists significant asymmetry in the roles that sectors play as sup-
pliers to others, and that the “sparseness” of the input-output matrix is unrelated to
the nature of aggregate fluctuations.
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1 Introduction
The possibility that significant aggregate fluctuations may originate from microeconomic shocks
to firms or disaggregated sectors has long been discarded in macroeconomics due to a “diversifi-
cation argument”. As argued by Lucas (1977), among others, such microeconomic shocks would
average out and thus, would only have negligible aggregate effects. In particular, the argument
goes, aggregate output concentrates around its mean at a very rapid rate: in an economy con-
sisting of n sectors hit by independent shocks, aggregate fluctuations would have a magnitude
proportional to 1/
√
n — a negligible effect at high levels of disaggregation.1
This argument, however, ignores the presence of interconnections between different firms and
sectors, functioning as a potential propagation mechanism of idiosyncratic shocks throughout the
economy. The possible role of such interconnections in propagation of shocks was highlighted dur-
ing the debate leading to the recent auto industry bailout. Appearing before the Senate Banking
Committee in November 2008, Alan R. Mulally, the chief executive of Ford, requested emergency
government support for General Motors and Chrysler, Ford’s traditional rivals. Mulally argued
that given the significant overlap in the suppliers and dealers of the three automakers, the collapse
of either GM or Chrysler would have a ripple effect across the industry, leading to severe disrup-
tion of Ford’s production operations within days, if not hours (Mulally (2008)). The possibility of
such “cascade effects” due to interconnections was also a key argument for government bailouts
of several large financial institutions during the financial crisis of 2007–2008.
This paper shows that the types of interconnections emphasized by Mulally indeed imply that
the effects of microeconomic shocks may not remain confined to where they originate. Rather,
microeconomic shocks may propagate throughout the economy, affect the output of other sectors,
and generate sizable aggregate effects. Our main contribution is to provide a general mathematical
framework for the analysis of such propagations and characterize how the extent of propagations
of idiosyncratic shocks and their role in aggregate fluctuations depend on the structure of interac-
tions between different sectors.
The following simple example illustrates the standard diversification argument and why it may
not apply in the presence of interconnections.
Example 1. Consider the economy depicted in Figure 1(a) consisting of n non-interacting sectors.
As n increases and the economy becomes more disaggregated, the diversification argument based
on the law of large numbers implies that independent sectoral shocks average out rapidly at the
rate
√
n. An identical reasoning is applicable to the economy depicted in Figure 1(b), where each
sector relies equally on the outputs of all other sectors. The symmetric structure of this economy
ensures that aggregate output is a symmetric function of the shocks to each sector, implying that
the diversification argument remains applicable.
1Gabaix (2011) shows that the diversification argument may not apply when the firm size distribution is sufficiently
heavy-tailed. See also Jovanovic (1987), Bak, Chen, Scheinkman, and Woodford (1993) and Durlauf (1993).
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(a) An economy in which no sector
relies on other sectors for production
(b) An economy in which each sector relies
equally on all other sectors
Figure 1: The network representations of two symmetric economies
The diversification argument would not be valid, however, if intersectoral input-output link-
ages exhibit no such symmetries. For instance, consider the economy depicted in Figure 2, in
which sector 1 is the sole input supplier to all others. In this case, as n increases, sectoral shocks
do not average out: even when n is large, shocks to sector 1 propagate strongly to the rest of the
economy, generating significant aggregate fluctuations.
Even though the “star network” in Figure 2 illustrates that, in the presence of interconnections,
sectoral shocks may not average out, it is also to some extent an extreme example. A key question,
therefore, is whether the effects of microeconomic shocks can be ignored in economies with more
realistic patterns of interconnections. The answer naturally depends on whether the intersectoral
network structures of actual economies resemble the economies in Figure 1 or the star network
structure in Figure 2. Figure 3 gives a first glimpse of the answer by depicting the input-output
linkages between 474 U.S. industries in 1997. It suggests that even though the pattern of sectoral
interconnections is not represented by a star network, it is also significantly different from the
networks depicted in Figure 1. In fact, as our analysis in Section 4 shows, in many ways the
Figure 2: An economy where one sector is the only supplier of all other sectors.
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Figure 3: Intersectoral network corresponding to the U.S. input-output matrix in 1997 (Source: Bureau of
Economic Analysis. See Section 4 for more details on the data). Each vertex corresponds to a sector in the
1997 benchmark detailed commodity-by-commodity direct requirements table. For every input transaction
above 5% of the total input purchases of a sector, a link is drawn between that sector and the input supplier.
structure of the intersectoral input-output relations of the U.S. economy resembles that of Figure
2, as a small number of sectors play a disproportionately important role as input suppliers to
others. Consequently, the interplay of sectoral shocks and the intersectoral network structure may
generate sizable aggregate fluctuations.
In order to develop these ideas more systematically, we consider a sequence of economies
{En}n∈N, corresponding to different levels of disaggregation.2 Each economy En consists of n sec-
tors whose input requirements are captured by an n × n matrix Wn. Entry (i, j) of this matrix
captures the share of sector j’s product in sector i’s production technology. Its j-th column sum,
which we refer to as the degree of sector j, corresponds to the share of j’s output in the input supply
of the entire economy. Given the sequence of economies {En}n∈N, we investigate whether aggregate
volatility, defined as the standard deviation of log output, vanishes as n → ∞. We show that in
certain cases, such as the star network, the law of large numbers fails and aggregate output does
not concentrate around a constant value.
The main focus of our analysis, however, is on the more interesting cases in which the law of
large numbers holds, yet the structure of the intersectoral network still has a defining effect on
2In our model economy, the total supply of labor is fixed. Therefore, an increase in the number of sectors is equivalent
to an increase in the level of disaggregation of the economy.
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aggregate fluctuations. We show that sectoral interconnections may imply that aggregate output
concentrates around its mean at a rate significantly slower than
√
n. Such slower rates of decay
mean that sectoral shocks would have a more significant role in creating aggregate fluctuations,
even at high levels of disaggregation. Our results also establish that slow rates of decay of ag-
gregate volatility may have two related but distinct causes. First, they may be due to first-order
interconnections: shocks to a sector which is a supplier to a disproportionally large number of other
sectors propagate directly to those sectors. Second, they may be due to higher-order interconnec-
tions: low productivity in one sector leads to a reduction in production of not only its immediate
downstream sectors but also a sequence of sectors interconnected to one another, creating cascade
effects.
In addition to illustrating the role of interconnections in creating aggregate fluctuations from
sectoral shocks, we prove three key theorems characterizing the rate of decay of aggregate volatil-
ity, and hence quantifying the impact of interconnections in terms of the structural properties of
the intersectoral network. Theorem 2 provides a lower bound in terms of the extent of asymme-
try across sectors captured by variations in their degrees. It shows that higher variations in the
degrees of different sectors imply lower rates of decay for aggregate volatility. A corollary to this
result shows that if the empirical distribution of degrees of the intersectoral network can be ap-
proximated by a power law (Pareto distribution) with shape parameter β ∈ (1, 2), then aggregate
volatility decays at a rate slower than n(β−1)/β . Theorem 3 provides tighter lower bounds in terms
of a measure of second-order interconnectivity between different sectors. This characterization is
important because two economies with identical empirical degree distributions (first-order con-
nections) may have significantly different levels of aggregate volatility resulting from the roles
that some sectors play as indirect input suppliers to the economy through chains of downstream
sectors. We use this extended characterization to provide a bound in terms of the empirical distri-
bution of the second-order degrees of different sectors within the economy, where the second-order
degree of sector i is defined as the weighted sum of the degrees of sectors that demand inputs
from i, with weights given by the input share of i in the production of these sectors. In particu-
lar, we show that if the empirical distribution of the second-order degrees can be approximated
by a power law with shape parameter ζ ∈ (1, 2), then aggregate volatility decays at a rate slower
than n(ζ−1)/ζ . Finally, Theorem 4 shows that the applicability of the diversification argument to the
economies depicted in Figure 1 is not a coincidence. In particular, it establishes that sectoral shocks
average out at the rate
√
n for balanced networks in which there is a uniform bound on the degree
of every sector. This result also underscores that, in contrast to a conjecture by Horvath (1998), the
nature of aggregate fluctuations resulting from sectoral shocks is not related to the sparseness of
the input-output matrix, but rather, to the extent of asymmetry between different sectors.3
3In the different but related context of financial contagion, Allen and Gale (2000) show that ring networks, which are
naturally very sparse, are more prone to systemic failures than a complete financial network.
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Our empirical exercise in Section 4 provides a summary of some of the relevant structural prop-
erties of the intersectoral network of the U.S. economy. We show that the empirical distributions of
both first-order and second-order degrees appear to have Pareto tails, with the latter exhibiting a
heavier tail with a shape parameter of ζ = 1.18. Presuming that this shape parameter also charac-
terizes the second-order degree distribution for large n, our results imply that aggregate volatility
in the U.S. economy decays at a rate slower than n0.15. This substantiates our claim above that the
pattern in Figure 3 is more similar to a star network than a complete network. Such a slow rate of
decay — compared to the
√
n convergence rate predicted by the standard diversification argument
— suggests that sizable aggregate fluctuations may originate from idiosyncratic shocks to different
sectors in the economy.
Our paper is most closely related to Gabaix (2011), who shows that firm-level idiosyncratic
shocks translate into aggregate fluctuations when the firm size distribution is sufficiently heavy-
tailed and the largest firms contribute disproportionally to aggregate output. In particular, in the
same vein as our Corollaries 1 and 2, he shows that if the firm size distribution is power law, aggre-
gate volatility decays at the rate na, where n in this context is the number of firms in the economy
and a < 1/2. The intersectoral network in our model plays the same role as the firm size distri-
bution in Gabaix’ analysis: shocks to sectors that take more central positions in the intersectoral
network have a disproportionate effect on aggregate output. Even though such central sectors are
also larger in equilibrium, there exist important distinctions between our work and Gabaix (2011).
First, in contrast to Gabaix, our focus is on the role played by input-output linkages between (dis-
aggregated) sectors in generating aggregate fluctuations. Second, the intersectoral network in our
model also shapes the pattern of sectoral comovements. Thus, a network-based approach leads to
a potentially very different behavior than an economy consisting of firms of unequal sizes — for
example, by imposing a range of additional restrictions on the interplay of aggregate and more
micro-level data.4
Our work is also closely related to the literature on the role of sectoral shocks in macro fluctua-
tions, such as Horvath (1998), Dupor (1999) and Shea (2002). Like these papers, we build on Long
and Plosser (1983)’s multi-sectoral model of real business cycles. The debate between Horvath
(1998, 2000) and Dupor (1999) centered around whether sectoral shocks would translate into ag-
gregate fluctuations. Our results provide fairly complete answers to the questions raised by these
papers. This literature also presents a variety of empirical evidence on the role of sectoral shocks,
but does not provide a general mathematical framework similar to the one developed here.5
Our work builds on Jovanovic (1987) and Durlauf (1993), who construct models with strong
4Foerster, Sarte, and Watson (2011) and Carvalho and Gabaix (2010) provide empirical evidence pointing to the im-
portance of the mechanisms emphasized here. Foerster, Sarte, and Watson (2011), for example, find significant sectoral
comovements consistent with the input-output structure of the economy, suggesting that the network origins of aggre-
gate fluctuations stressed in this paper are likely to be present in practice, at least to some extent.
5Our model is also related to the smaller literature on the implications of input-output linkages on economic growth
and cross-country income differences. See, for example, Ciccone (2002) and Jones (2011).
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strategic complementarities across firms and show that such complementarities may translate firm
level shocks into volatility at the aggregate level. It is also related to Bak et al. (1993), which stresses
the importance of supply chains in aggregate fluctuations. This paper provides a more compre-
hensive and tractable framework for the analysis of input-output interactions and characterizes
the extent to which such interactions translate idiosyncratic shocks into aggregate volatility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic economic environ-
ment and characterizes the influence vector, which summarizes the relevant features of the inter-
sectoral network. Section 3 contains our main results, characterizing the relationship between the
structural properties of the intersectoral network and the rate at which aggregate volatility van-
ishes. Section 4 illustrates the implications of our results using information from the U.S. input-
output matrix. It also shows that second-order interconnections indeed appear to play an impor-
tant role. Section 5 concludes. All proofs and some additional mathematical details are presented
in the Appendix.
Notation
Throughout the paper, unless otherwise noted, all vectors are assumed to be column vectors. We
denote the transpose of a matrix X by X ′. We write x ≥ y, if vector x is element-wise greater than
or equal to vector y. Similarly, we write x > y, if every element of x is strictly greater than the
corresponding element in y. We use 1 to denote the vector of all ones, the size of which is adjusted
to and clear from the context. We use ‖ · ‖p to denote the p-norm of a vector as well as the induced
p-norm of a matrix.
Given two sequences of positive real numbers {an}n∈N and {bn}n∈N, we write an = O(bn), if
they satisfy lim supn→∞ an/bn < ∞, and an = Ω(bn) if lim infn→∞ an/bn > 0. Moreover, we write
an = Θ(bn), if an = O(bn) and an = Ω(bn) hold simultaneously. Finally, an = o(bn) means that
limn→∞ an/bn = 0.
2 Model
We consider a static variant of the multi-sector model of Long and Plosser (1983). The represen-
tative household is endowed with one unit of labor, supplied inelastically, and has Cobb-Douglas
preferences over n distinct goods; that is,
u(c1, c2, . . . , cn) = A
n∏
i=1
(ci)
1/n, (1)
where ci is the consumption of good i and A is a normalization constant discussed below.
Each good in the economy is produced by a competitive sector and can be either consumed or
used by other sectors as an input for production. The sectors use Cobb-Douglas technologies with
6
constant returns to scale. In particular, the output of sector i, denoted by xi, is
xi = z
α
i `
α
i
n∏
j=1
x
(1−α)wij
ij , (2)
where `i is the amount of labor hired by the sector, α ∈ (0, 1) is the share of labor, xij is the amount
of commodity j used in the production of good i, and zi is the idiosyncratic productivity shock
to sector i. We assume that productivity shocks zi are independent across sectors, and denote the
distribution of i ≡ log(zi) by Fi. The exponent wij ≥ 0 designates the share of good j in the
total intermediate input use of firms in sector i. In particular, wij = 0 if sector i does not use
good j as input for production. In view of the Cobb-Douglas technology in (2) and competitive
factor markets, wij ’s also correspond to the entries of input-output tables, measuring the value of
spending on input j per dollar of production of good i.6 The following assumption implies that
the sectoral production functions exhibit constant returns to scale:7
Assumption 1. The input shares of all sectors add up to one; that is,
∑n
j=1wij = 1 for all i =
1, 2, . . . , n.
We summarize the structure of intersectoral trade with the input-output matrix W with en-
teries wij . Thus, the economy is completely specified by the tuple E = (I,W, {Fi}i∈I), where
I = {1, 2, . . . , n} denotes the set of sectors.
Input-output relationships between different sectors can be equivalently represented by a di-
rected weighted graph on n vertices, called the intersectoral network of the economy. Each vertex in
this graph corresponds to a sector in the economy and a directed edge (j, i) with weight wij > 0 is
present from vertex i to vertex j if sector i is an input supplier to sector j. We use the notions of
the intersectoral network and input-output matrix interchangeably as equivalent representations
of the structure of intersectoral trades.
We also define the weighted outdegree, or simply the degree, of sector i as the share of sector i’s
output in the input supply of the entire economy normalized by constant 1− α; that is,
di ≡
n∑
j=1
wji.
Clearly, when all non-zero edge weights are identical, the outdegree of vertex i is proportional to
the number of sectors it is a supplier to. Finally, we refer to the collection {d1, d2, . . . , dn} as the
degree sequence of economy E .8
6See Section 4 for more details.
7The constant returns to scale assumption can be relaxed without any bearing on our results. In particular,∑n
j=1 wij = η < 1 is equivalent to the presence of another fixed factor with exponent (1− η) (1− α) in the produc-
tion function of all sectors.
8Similarly, one can define an indegree for any given sector. However, in view of Assumption 1, the (weighted)
indegrees of all sectors are equal to one. We show in Section 4 that this is a good approximation to the patterns we
observe in the U.S. data.
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As we show in the appendix, in the competitive equilibrium of economy E = (I,W, {Fi}i∈I),
the logarithm of real value added is given by
y ≡ log(GDP) = v′, (3)
where  ≡ [1, 2, . . . , n]′ and the n-dimensional vector v, called the influence vector, is defined as
v ≡ α
n
[
I − (1− α)W ′]−1 1. (4)
Thus, the logarithm of real value added, which for simplicity we refer to as aggregate output, is
a linear combination of log sectoral shocks with coefficients determined by the elements of the
influence vector. Equation (4) shows that aggregate output depends on the intersectoral network
of the economy through the Leontief inverse [I − (1− α)W ′]−1 (see Burress (1994)). It also captures
how sectoral productivity shocks propagate downstream to other sectors through the input-output
matrix.9 Finally, note that without the normalization constant A in (1), the logarithm of real value
added would be y = µ + v′, where the expression for µ is provided in Appendix A. Clearly, this
normalization only changes the mean of aggregate output and has no effect on its volatility or
other distributional properties.
We note that the influence vector is closely related to the Bonacich centrality vector correspond-
ing to the intersectoral network.10 Thus, sectors that take more “central” positions in the network
representation of the economy play a more important role in determining aggregate output. This
observation is consistent with the intuition that productivity shocks to a sector with more direct or
indirect downstream customers should have more significant aggregate effects.
The vector v is also the “sales vector” of the economy. In particular, as shown in Appendix A,
the i-th element of the influence vector is equal to the equilibrium share of sales of sector i,
vi =
pixi∑n
j=1 pjxj
(5)
with pi denoting the equilibrium price of good i. This is not surprising in view of the results
in Hulten (1978) and Gabaix (2011), relating aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) to firm- or
sector-level TFPs weighted by sales.11 This observation also implies that there exists a close con-
nection between our results on the network origins of output fluctuations and Gabaix’ results on
their granular origins. A major difference is that the distribution of sales shares across sectors (or
9In general, sectoral shocks also affect upstream production through a price and a quantity effect. For instance, with
a negative shock to a sector, (i) its output price increases, raising its demand for inputs; and (ii) its production decreases,
reducing its demand for inputs. With Cobb-Douglas production technologies, however, these two effects cancel out.
See Shea (2002) for more details.
10For more on the Bonacich centrality measure, see Bonacich (1987) and Jackson (2008). For another application of
this notion in economics, see Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2006).
11Note that in contrast to Hulten (1978)’s formula, the logarithms of sectoral shocks (i.e, the ’s) are multiplied by
sales shares, and not by sales divided by value added. This is due to the fact that shocks in our model correspond to
Harrod-neutral changes in productivity (zi = exp (i) is raised to the power α), whereas Hulten considers Hicks-neutral
changes in productivity.
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other micro units) in our model is derived from input-output interactions. This not only provides
microfoundations for such size differences but also enables us to sharply characterize the role of
important structural properties of the network in shaping aggregate volatility. Furthermore, un-
like in Gabaix (2011), the structure of interconnections also determines the comovements between
different sectors, placing a range of additional restrictions on the interplay of aggregate and more
micro-level data (see footnote 4).
Finally, note that rather than deriving (3) and (4) as the equilibrium of a multi-sector economy,
one could have started with a reduced form model y˜ = W˜ y˜ + ˜, where y˜ is the vector consisting
of the output levels, value added or other actions (or the logarithms thereof) of n economic units;
W˜ is a matrix capturing the interactions between them; and ˜ is a vector of independent shocks
to each unit. The results presented in the remainder of the paper are applicable to any alternative
model with such a representation.
3 Network Structure and Aggregate Fluctuations
In this section, we focus on a sequence of economies where the number of sectors increases, and
characterize how the structure of the intersectoral network affects the nature of aggregate fluc-
tuations. In particular, we consider a sequence of economies {En}n∈N indexed by the number of
sectors n. The economy indexed n is defined as En = (In,Wn, {Fin}i∈In), where In = {1, 2, . . . , n}
is the set of sectors in the economy; Wn captures the corresponding input-output matrix; and the
collection {Fin}i∈In denotes the distributions of log sectoral shocks. Note that since the total sup-
ply of labor is normalized to one for all n, an increase in the number of sectors corresponds to
disaggregating the structure of the economy.12
Given a sequence of economies {En}n∈N, we denote the corresponding sequence of aggregate
outputs and influence vectors by {yn}n∈N and {vn}n∈N, respectively. We use wnij and dni to denote a
generic element of the intersectoral matrix Wn and the degree of sector i, respectively. Finally, we
denote the sequence of vectors of (log) idiosyncratic productivity shocks to the sectors by {n}n∈N,
and impose the following assumption on their distributions:
Assumption 2. Given a sequence of economies {En}n∈N, for any sector i ∈ In and all n ∈ N,
(a) Ein = 0,
(b) var(in) = σ2in ∈ (σ2, σ2), where 0 < σ < σ are independent of n.
Assumption 2(a) is a normalization. Assumption 2(b) imposes the restriction that log sectoral
shock variances remain bounded as n→∞. This assumption enables us to isolate the effects of the
12The fact that higher values of n correspond to greater disaggregation does not put any relevant restrictions on the
behavior of the sequence of input-output matrices {Wn}n∈N for large n, except that the largest, second largest, third-
largest, etc., entries of each row should be non-increasing in n. This does not constrain the behavior of {vn}n∈N.
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intersectoral network structure on aggregate fluctuations as the economy gets more disaggregated,
from those of the decay rate of idiosyncratic volatilities.
3.1 Aggregate Volatility
Recall that aggregate output of an economy can be characterized in terms of its influence vector
as yn = v′nn. Assumption 2(a) and independence of sectoral productivity shocks imply that the
standard deviation of aggregate output, which we refer to as aggregate volatility, is given by
(var yn)
1/2 =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
σ2inv
2
in,
where vin denotes the i-th element of vn. Thus, for any sequence of economies {En}n∈N satisfying
Assumption 2(b),
(var yn)
1/2 = Θ(‖vn‖2). (6)
In other words, aggregate volatility scales with the Euclidean norm of the influence vector as our
representation of the economy becomes more disaggregated.13
Though simple, this relationship shows that the rate of decay of aggregate volatility upon dis-
aggregation may be distinct from
√
n — the rate predicted by the standard diversification argu-
ment. Moreover, it also suggests that the argument for the irrelevance of sectoral shocks need not
hold in general. In particular, in the extreme cases where ‖vn‖2 is bounded away from zero for
all values of n, aggregate volatility does not disappear even as n → ∞. This is illustrated in the
following example.
Example 1 (continued). Recall the economy depicted in Figure 2, in which sector 1 is the single
input supplier of all other sectors. Using expression (4), one can verify that the corresponding
influence vector is given by v′n =
α
n1
′ + [(1 − α), 0, · · · , 0], implying that ‖vn‖2 = Θ(1). Thus, in
view of (6), aggregate volatility does not vanish even as n→∞— an observation consistent with
the intuition discussed in the Introduction.
3.2 Asymptotic Distributions
Even though Example 1 shows that in the presence of strong intersectoral input-output relations,
the law of large numbers may not hold, one would expect that in most realistic situations aggregate
volatility vanishes as n → ∞.14 Nevertheless, even in such sequences of economics, the network
13If in violation of Assumption 2(b) sectoral volatilities change at some rate σn as n → ∞, then (var yn)1/2 =
Θ(σn‖vn‖2); that is, the rate at which aggregate volatility decays is determined by σn as well as the Euclidean norm
of the influence vector. This also makes it clear that Assumption 2(b) is implicitly imposed whenever the standard
diversification argument is invoked; otherwise, aggregate volatility averages out at the rate σn/
√
n rather than 1/
√
n.
14In particular, as Golub and Jackson (2010) show in the context of information aggregation in social networks,
‖vn‖2 → 0 only if ‖vn‖∞ → 0. That is, the law of large numbers fails only if there exists some sector whose influ-
ence or sales share remains bounded away from zero even as n→ 0.
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structure may have a defining effect on aggregate fluctuations. The next theorem takes a first
step towards characterizing these effects by determining the asymptotic distribution of aggregate
output.
Theorem 1. Consider a sequence of economies {En}n∈N and assume that E2in = σ2 for all i ∈ In and all
n ∈ N.
(a) If {in} are normally distributed for all i and all n , then 1‖vn‖2 yn
d−→ N (0, σ2).
(b) Suppose that there exist constant a > 0 and random variable  with bounded variance and cumulative
distribution function F¯ , such that Fin(x) < F¯ (x) for all x < −a, and Fin(x) > F¯ (x) for all x > a.
Also suppose that ‖vn‖∞‖vn‖2 −→ 0. Then
1
‖vn‖2 yn
d−→ N (0, σ2).
(c) Suppose that {in} are identically, but not normally distributed for all i ∈ In and all n. If ‖vn‖∞‖vn‖2 6−→ 0,
then the asymptotic distribution of 1‖vn‖2 yn, when it exists, is non-normal and has finite variance σ
2.
Theorem 1 establishes that aggregate output normalized by the Euclidean norm of the influ-
ence vector — which is a function of the economy’s intersectoral network —- converges to a non-
degenerate distribution. It is thus a natural complement to, and strengthens, equation (6).
Theorem 1 also shows that, unless all shocks are normally distributed, the intersectoral struc-
ture of the economy not only affects the convergence rate, but also determines the asymptotic
distribution of aggregate output: depending on ‖vn‖∞ — which captures the influence of the most
central sector — aggregate output (properly normalized) may converge to a non-normal distri-
bution. In fact, if the conditions in part (c) of the theorem hold, the asymptotic distribution of
aggregate output would necessarily depend on the specific distribution of the sectoral-level pro-
ductivity shocks. Part (b), on the other hand, shows that if all distribution functions have tails
that are dominated by a random variable with a bounded variance and if ‖vn‖∞ converges to zero
faster than ‖vn‖2, then aggregate output converges to a normal distribution.15 In either case, the
limiting variance of yn/‖vn‖2 is finite and equal to σ2.
3.3 First-Order Interconnections
In the remainder of this section, we characterize the rate of decay of aggregate volatility in terms
of the structural properties of the intersectoral network; properties that summarize relevant charac-
teristics of the network without providing full details on all entries of matrix Wn.
We first focus on the effects of first-order interconnections on aggregate volatility. In particular,
we show that the extent of asymmetry between sectors, measured in terms of the coefficient of
variation of the degree sequence of the intersectoral network, shapes the relationship between
sectoral shocks and aggregate volatility.
15Note that part (c) is stated conditional on the existence of such an asymptotic distribution. This is necessary as we
have not assumed any restriction on the sequence of economies, and thus, ‖vn‖∞ and ‖vn‖2 may not have well-behaved
limits. No such assumption, beyond the dominance condition, is required for part (b).
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Definition 1. Given an economy En with sectoral degrees {dn1 , dn2 , . . . , dnn}, the coefficient of variation
is
CVn ≡ 1
d¯n
[
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(dni − d¯n)2
]1/2
,
where d¯n = (
∑n
i=1 d
n
i ) /n is the average degree.
Theorem 2. Given a sequence of economies {En}n∈N, aggregate volatility satisfies
(var yn)
1/2 = Ω
 1
n
√√√√ n∑
i=1
(dni )
2
 (7)
and
(var yn)
1/2 = Ω
(
1 + CVn√
n
)
. (8)
Theorem 2 states that if the degree sequence of the intersectoral network exhibits high variabil-
ity as measured by the coefficient of variation, then there is also high variability in the effect of
different sector-specific shocks on the aggregate output. Such asymmetries in the roles of sectors
imply that aggregate volatility decays at a rate slower than
√
n. This result also shows that the
intersectoral network has a defining effect on aggregate volatility — even when the law of large
numbers holds. Intuitively, when the coefficient of variation is high, only a small fraction of sectors
are responsible for the majority of the input supplies in the economy. Shocks to these sectors then
propagate through the entire economy as their low (resp., high) productivity leads to lower (resp.,
higher) production for all of their downstream sectors.
Theorem 2 also provides a more precise way of understanding the essence of the results in
Example 1.
Example 1 (continued). Recall the economy with the star network representation discussed in
the Introduction and depicted in Figure 2. It is easy to verify that for such an economy, CVn =
Θ(
√
n). Thus, by Theorem 2, aggregate volatility is lower bounded by a constant for all values of
n, implying that the law of large numbers fails. More generally, the theorem implies that if the
economy contains a “dominant” sector whose degree grows linearly with n, aggregate volatility
remains bounded away from zero irrespective of the level of disaggregation.
A complementary intuition for the results in Theorem 2 can be obtained from equation (7),
which can also be interpreted as a condition on the tail of the empirical distribution of the degrees:
aggregate volatility is higher in economies whose corresponding degree sequences have a “heav-
ier tail”. This effect can be easily quantified for intersectoral networks with power law degree
sequences.
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Definition 2. A sequence of economies {En}n∈N has a power law degree sequence if there exist a
constant β > 1; a slowly-varying function L(·) satisfying limt→∞ L(t)tδ =∞ and limt→∞ L(t)t−δ =
0 for all δ > 0; and a sequence of positive numbers cn = Θ(1) such that for all n ∈ N and all
k < dnmax = Θ(n
1/β), we have
Pn(k) = cnk
−βL(k),
where Pn(k) ≡ 1n |{i ∈ In : dni > k}| is the empirical counter-cumulative distribution function and
dnmax is the maximum degree of En.
This definition is consistent with the commonly-used definition that a variable has an empirical
distribution with a power law tail if logP (x) ' γ0 − β log x for sufficiently large values of x.
The shape parameter β > 1 captures the scaling behavior of the tail of the (empirical) degree
distribution: lower values of β correspond to heavier tails and thus to larger variations in the
degree sequence. Applying Theorem 2 to a sequence of economies with power law tails leads to
the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Consider a sequence of economies {En}n∈N with a power law degree sequence and the corre-
sponding shape parameter β ∈ (1, 2). Then, aggregate volatility satisfies
(var yn)
1/2 = Ω
(
n
−β−1
β
−δ)
,
where δ > 0 is arbitrary.
This corollary establishes that if the degree sequence of the intersectoral network exhibits rel-
atively heavy tails, aggregate volatility decreases at a much slower rate than the one predicted by
the standard diversification argument. Note that Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 provide only a lower
bound on the rate at which aggregate volatility vanishes. Thus, even if the shape parameter of the
power law structure is large, higher-order structural properties of the intersectoral network may
still prevent the output volatility from decaying at rate
√
n as we show next.
3.4 Second-Order Interconnections and Cascades
First-order interconnections provide only partial information about the structure of the input-
output relationships between different sectors. In particular, as the next example demonstrates,
two economies with identical degree sequences may have significantly distinct structures and thus,
exhibit considerably different levels of network-originated aggregate volatility.
Example 2. Consider two sequence of economies {En}n∈N and {Ên}n∈N, with corresponding inter-
sectoral networks depicted in Figures 4(a) and 4(b), respectively. Each edge shown in the figures
has weight one and all others have weight zero. Clearly, the two network structures have identical
degree sequences for all n ∈ N. In particular, the economy indexed n in each sequence contains
a sector of degree dn (labeled sector 1), dn − 1 sectors of degree d˜n (labeled 2 through dn), with
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the rest of sectors having degrees zero.16 However, the two economies may exhibit very different
levels of aggregate fluctuations.
(a) En: high degree sectors share a common supplier (b) Ên: high degree sectors do not share a common supplier
Figure 4: The two structures have identical degree sequences for all values of n. However, depending on
the rates of dn and d˜n, aggregate output volatility may exhibit considerably different behaviors for large
values of n.
The influence vector corresponding to the sequence {En}n∈N depicted in Figure 4(a) is given by
vin =

1/n+ v2n(1− α)(dn − 1)/α if i = 1
α/n+ α(1− α)d˜n/n if 2 ≤ i ≤ dn
α/n otherwise,
implying that ‖vn‖2 = Θ(1); i.e., aggregate volatility of En does not converge to zero as n → ∞,
regardless of the values of dn and d˜n.
On the other hand, the influence vector corresponding to the sequence {Ên}n∈N in Figure 4(b)
is given by
v̂in =

1/n+ (1− α)(dn − 1)/n if i = 1
1/n+ (1− α)(d˜n − 1)/n if 2 ≤ i ≤ dn
α/n otherwise,
implying that ‖v̂n‖2 = Θ(dn/n + 1/
√
dn). Thus, even though {En}n∈N and {Ên}n∈N have identi-
cal degree sequences for all n, the rates of decay of ‖vn‖2 and ‖vˆn‖2 may be very different. For
example, if dn = Θ(
√
n), then ‖v̂n‖2 = Θ(1/ 4
√
n), whereas ‖vn‖2 = Θ(1).
As Example 2 suggests, first-order interconnections in the intersectoral network provide little
or no information on the extent of “cascade” effects, whereby shocks to a sector affect not only its
immediate downstream sectors but also the downstream customers of those sectors and so on. Our
16Since the total number of sectors in economy En is equal to n, it must be the case that (dn − 1)d˜n + dn = n. Such a
decomposition in terms of positive integers dn and d˜n is not possible for all n ∈ N. However, the main issue discussed in
this example remains valid, as only the rates at which dn and d˜n change as functions of n are relevant for our argument.
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next result provides a lower bound on the decay rate of aggregate volatility in terms of second-
order interconnections in the intersectoral network. The key concept capturing the role of such
interconnections is the following new statistic.
Definition 3. The second-order interconnectivity coefficient of economy En is
τ2(Wn) ≡
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i,j
wnjiw
n
kid
n
j d
n
k . (9)
This coefficient measures the extent to which sectors with high degrees (those that are major
suppliers to other sectors) are interconnected to one another through common suppliers. More
specifically, τ2 takes higher values when high-degree sectors share suppliers with other high-
degree sectors, as opposed to low-degree ones.17 At an intuitive level, the example of Ford, Gen-
eral Motors and Chrysler discussed in the Introduction corresponds to a network structure with
a high second-order interconnectivity coefficient: not only all three automakers are highly impor-
tant firms, but also they rely on the same set of suppliers. Finally, it is worth stressing that the
information captured by τ2 is fundamentally different from the information encoded in the degree
sequence of a network. We have the following result:
Theorem 3. Given a sequence of economies {En}n∈N, aggregate volatility satisfies
(var yn)
1/2 = Ω
(
1√
n
+
CVn√
n
+
√
τ2(Wn)
n
)
. (10)
Theorem 3 shows how second-order interconnections, captured by coefficient τ2, affect aggre-
gate volatility. It also shows that even if the empirical degree distributions of two sequences of
economies are identical for all n, aggregate volatilities may exhibit considerably different behav-
iors. In this sense, Theorem 3 is a refinement of Theorem 2, taking both first and second-order
relations between different sectors into account. It can also be considered to be the economically
more interesting result, as it captures not only the fact that some sectors are “large” suppliers,
but also the more subtle notion that there is a clustering of significant sectors, caused by the fact
that they have common suppliers. Thus, in essence, Theorem 3 captures the possibility of cascade
effects in the economy.
Example 2 (continued). Recall the sequences of economies {En}n∈N and {Ên}n∈N depicted in Fig-
ure 4. As mentioned earlier, intersectoral networks corresponding to the two sequences have iden-
tical empirical degree distributions for all n ∈ N. On the other hand, it is straightforward to ver-
ify that the second-order interconnectivity coefficients are very different; in particular, τ2(Wn) =
17This observation is a consequence of the Rearrangement Inequality, which states that if a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ ar and
b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ br , then for any permutation (aˆ1, aˆ2, . . . , aˆr) of (a1, a2, . . . , ar), we have∑ri=1 aibi ≥ ∑ri=1 aˆibi. See,
e.g., Steele (2004).
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Θ(n2) whereas τ2(Ŵn) = 0. This is the reason behind the stark difference in the decay rate of
aggregate volatility in the two sequences of economies.
Similar to the representation given in (7), we can also summarize the effects of second-order
interconnection in terms of the tail of the second-order degree sequence of the economy, where the
second-order degree of sector i is defined as the weighted sum of the degrees of the sectors that
use sector i’s product as inputs with weights given by the corresponding input shares, i.e.,
qni ≡
n∑
j=1
dnjw
n
ji. (11)
We have the following counterpart to Corollary 1.
Corollary 2. Suppose {En}n∈N is a sequence of economies whose second-order degree sequences have power
law tails with shape parameter ζ ∈ (1, 2) (cf. Definition 2). Then, aggregate volatility satisfies
(var yn)
1/2 = Ω
(
n
− ζ−1
ζ
−δ)
,
for any δ > 0.
The above corollary establishes that if the distributions of second-order degrees have relatively
heavy tails, then aggregate volatility decreases at a much slower rate than the one predicted by
the standard diversification argument. As Example 2 shows, second-order effects may dominate
the first-order effect of the degree distribution in determining the decay rate of aggregate volatility
of the economy. In particular, for a sequence of economies in which the empirical distributions
of both first- and second-order degrees have power law tails with exponents β and ζ, the tighter
bound for the decay rate of aggregate volatility is determined by min {β, ζ}.
The results in Theorem 3 can be further strengthened to capture the effects of higher-order
interconnections and more complex patterns of cascades. We provide such a characterization in
Appendix D, corresponding to tighter lower bounds on the decay rate of aggregate volatility.
3.5 Balanced Structures
Finally, we establish a partial converse to Theorem 2, showing that with limited variations in the
degrees of different sectors, aggregate volatility decays at rate
√
n — consistent with the standard
diversification argument.
Definition 4. A sequence of economies {En}n∈N is balanced if maxi∈In dni = Θ(1).
In balanced structures, there is a limit to the extent of asymmetry in the importance of different
sectors as suppliers, in the sense that the degree of no sector increases unboundedly as n → ∞.
Thus, balanced structures can be considered as the polar opposites of network structures with
“dominant” sectors — sectors whose degrees grow linearly as n→∞— such as the one in Figure
2.
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Theorem 4. Consider a sequence of balanced economies {En}n∈N. Then there exists α¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that
for α ≥ α¯, (var yn)1/2 = Θ(1/
√
n).
This theorem shows that when the intersectoral network has a balanced structure and the role
of the intermediate inputs in production is not too large, volatility decays at rate
√
n, implying that
other structural properties of the network cannot contribute any further to aggregate volatility.
Consequently, in economies with balanced intersectoral network structures, aggregate fluctuations
do not have network origins.
A noteworthy corollary to this theorem is that many network structures that are often consid-
ered to be “fragile”, such as the ring and the binary tree depcited in Figure 5, have exactly the
same asymptotic behavior as the structures in Figure 1 as far as aggregate volatility is concerned.
In fact, the “sparseness” of the input-output matrix has no impact on this asymptotic behavior. It
is only in network structures with asymmetric roles for different sectors — either in terms of first-
order or higher-order interconnections — that sectoral (or more micro) shocks can be the origins
of aggregate fluctuations.
(a) The ring (b) The binary tree
Figure 5: Economies with balanced intersectoral network structures: aggregate volatility decays at rate
√
n.
Theorem 4 is a generalization of the results of Dupor (1999). As noted by Dupor and Horvath
(1998), Theorem 4 is both an aggregation and an irrelevance result for economies with balanced
structures. As an aggregation result it suggests an observational equivalence between the one-
sector economy and any multi-sector economy with a balanced structure. On the other hand, as an
irrelevance result, it shows that within the class of balanced structures, different input-output ma-
trices generate roughly the same amount of volatility. However, note that in contrast to the claims
in Lucas (1977) and Dupor (1999), our earlier results clearly establish that neither the aggregation
nor the irrelevance interpretations may hold when the intersectoral network is not balanced.
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4 Application
In this section, we briefly look at the intersectoral network structure of the U.S. economy and
study its implications for aggregate fluctuations in light of the results presented in Section 3.
For this purpose, we use the detailed benchmark input-output accounts spanning the 1972–2002
period, compiled every five years by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We use commodity-by-
commodity direct requirements tables where the typical (i, j) entry captures the value of spending
on commodity i per dollar of production of commodity j (evaluated at current producer prices).18
These detailed input-output accounts constitute the finest level of disaggregation available for the
U.S. inter-sectoral trade data, with most sectors (roughly) corresponding to four-digit S.I.C. defini-
tions.19 Even though we consider our results applicable at a finer level than that available through
the BEA tables, this exercise is useful to obtain a rough empirical grounding for our results. More-
over, it enables us to perform back-of-the-envelope calculations to get an impression of the role
played by the U.S. input-output structure in the relationship between sectoral shocks and aggre-
gate volatility.
We start by analyzing the variation in total intermediate input shares across commodities, or
equivalently, the variation in the (weighted) indegrees for each sector. The first panel of Figure 6
shows the non-parametric estimate of the empirical density of intermediate input shares for 2002.
The second panel displays the same densities for every detailed direct requirements table since
1972.20 In line with the previous estimates of Basu (1995) and Jones (forthcoming), by averaging
across years and sectors we find an intermediate input share of 0.55. This average share is stable
over time, ranging between a minimum of 0.52 in 1987 and a maximum of 0.58 in 2002. Even
though some sectors are more (intermediate) input-intensive than others, the indegrees of most
sectors are concentrated around the mean: on average 71 percent of the sectors are within one
standard deviation of the mean input share.21
Recall that in our model we assumed that the intermediate input share is the same and equal
to 1 − α across all sectors. Thus, in order to obtain the data counterpart of our W matrix, we
renormalized each entry in the direct requirements tables by the total input requirement of the
corresponding sector and then computed the corresponding first and second-order degrees, di
and qi respectively.22 Figure 7 shows the non-parametric estimates of the corresponding empirical
densities in 2002.23
18By slightly abusing terminology, we use the terms commodity and sector interchangeably throughout this section.
19The BEA tables for the period 1972–1992 are based on an evolving S.I.C. classification, whereas the NAICS system
was adopted from 1997 onwards. While individual sectors are not immediately comparable across S.I.C. and NAICS
classifications, the corresponding intersectoral network structures — the objects of analysis in this paper — will be
shown to be remarkably stable.
20We used the Gaussian distribution as the kernel smoothing function with a bandwidth of 0.3.
21This is again stable over different years, ranging from 0.74 in 1977 to 0.67 in 2002. The equivalent two standard
deviation number is 0.95.
22We checked that all results below still apply when we do not perform this normalization.
23In Figure 7, we excluded commodities with zero outdegree, i.e., those that do not enter as intermediate inputs in
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Figure 6: Empirical densities of intermediate input shares (indegrees)
Unlike their indegree counterpart, the empirical distributions of both first and second-order
(out)degrees are noticeably skewed, with heavy right tails. Such skewed distributions are indica-
tive of presence of commodities that are (i) general purpose inputs used by many other sectors; (ii)
major suppliers to sectors that produce the general purpose inputs.24 In either case, the fraction of
commodities whose weighted first-order (resp., second-order) degrees are an order of magnitude
above the mean first-order (resp., second-order) degree is non-negligible.25
To further characterize such heavy tailed behaviors, Figures 8 and 9 plot the empirical counter-
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Figure 7: Empirical densities of first and second-order degrees
the production of other commodities.
24The top five sectors with the highest first-order degrees are: management of companies and enterprises, whole-
sale trade, real estate, electric power generation, transmission, and distribution, and iron and steel mills and ferroalloy
manufacturing. The top five sectors with the highest second-order degrees are: management of companies and enter-
prises, wholesale trade, real estate, advertising and related services, and monetary authorities and depository credit
intermediation.
25Note that, given the normalization discussed above, the mean first-order and second-order degrees are equal to one.
19
10−6 10−4 10−2 100 102
10−2
10−1
100
First Order Weighted Outdegree
E m
p i r
i c a
l  C
C D
F
2002
10−6 10−4 10−2 100 102
10−2
10−1
100
First Order Weighted Outdegree
E m
p i r
i c a
l  C
C D
F
1972
1977
1982
1987
1992
1997
Figure 8: Empirical counter-cumulative distribution function of first-order degrees
cumulative distribution functions (i.e., one minus the empirical cumulative distribution functions)
of the first-order and second-order degrees on a log-log scale. The first panels in both figures
also show non-parametric estimates for the empirical counter-cumulative distributions in 2002
using the Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression with a bandwidth selected using least squares cross-
validation (Nadaraya (1964) and Watson (1964)). The second panels show the empirical counter-
cumulative distributions for all other years. In either case, the tail of the distribution is well-
approximated by a power law distribution as shown by the approximate linear relationship.
An estimate for the shape parameters can in principle be obtained by running an ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression of the empirical log-CCDF on the log-outdegree sequence. However, as
Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011) point out, these simple OLS estimates are downward biased in small
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Figure 9: Empirical counter-cumulative distribution function of second-order degrees
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samples. Thus, to account for this bias, we implement the modified log rank-log size regression
suggested by Gabaix and Ibragimov. Throughout, we take the tail of the counter-cumulative dis-
tributions to correspond to the top 20% largest sectors in terms of d and q. The resulting estimates
are shown in Table 1 along with the corresponding standard errors. Notice that the estimates for
the shape parameter of the first order-degree distribution are always above the corresponding es-
timates for the second-order degree distribution. Averaging the OLS estimates across years, we
obtain β̂ = 1.38 and ζ̂ = 1.18 for the first and second-order degree distributions, respectively.
1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002
β̂ 1.38
(0.20; 97)
1.38
(0.19; 105)
1.35
(0.18; 106)
1.37
(0.19; 102)
1.32
(0.19; 95)
1.43
(0.21; 95)
1.46
(0.23; 83)
ζ̂ 1.14
(0.16; 97)
1.15
(0.16; 105)
1.10
(0.15; 106)
1.14
(0.16; 102)
1.15
(0.17; 95)
1.27
(0.18; 95)
1.30
(0.20; 83)
n 483 524 529 510 476 474 417
Table 1: OLS estimates of β and ζ using Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011) correction. The numbers in paren-
theses denote the associated standard errors and the number of observations used in the estimation of the
shape parameter (corresponding to the top 20% of sectors). The last row shows the total number of sectors
for that year.
As a cross-check, we also calculated the average slope implied by the non-parametric Nadaraya-
Watson regression, while again taking the tail to correspond to 20% of the samples in each year.
Averaging over years, the absolute values of the implied slopes are 1.28 and 1.17 for the first and
second-order degree distributions respectively, which are fairly close to the OLS estimates. As
yet another alternative, we also calculated Hill-type MLE estimates of β and ζ. In particular, we
followed Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman (2009) in using all observations on or above some endoge-
nously determined cut-off point. Averaging across years, these MLE estimates are β̂ = 1.39 and
ζ̂ = 1.14, which are again very close to the baseline OLS estimates reported above.26
These estimates imply that there exists a high degree of asymmetry in the U.S. economy in
terms of the roles that different sectors play as direct or indirect suppliers to others, consistent with
the hypothesis that the interplay of sectoral shocks and network effects leads to sizable aggregate
fluctuations. We next attempt to give preliminary estimates of the quantitative extent of these
network effects using two complementary approaches.
First, in order to estimate the aggregate effects of sectoral shocks, we compute ‖vn‖2 for the U.S.
input-output matrix at different levels of aggregation and for different years. The first two rows
of Table 2 present the estimates obtained from the detailed level and summary level input-output
BEA tables, with nd and ns respectively denoting the number of sectors at the corresponding levels
26The impact of normalizing the input shares is also negligible for these estimates. Using the original direct-
requirements tables to compute first and second order degrees gives average OLS estimates of β̂ = 1.42 and ζ̂ = 1.23.
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of disaggregation.
As the first row of Table 2 shows, the estimates for ‖vnd‖2 at different years are roughly twice
as large as 1/
√
nd. This suggests that, at this level of disaggregation, intersectoral linkages increase
the impact of sectoral shocks by at least twofold. Furthermore, as expected, the estimates for ‖vnd‖2
are smaller than the ones obtained from the more aggregated data at the summary level, ‖vns‖2.
1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002
‖vnd‖2 0.098
(nd=483)
0.091
(nd=524)
0.088
(nd=529)
0.088
(nd=510)
0.093
(nd=476)
0.090
(nd=474)
0.094
(nd=417)
‖vns‖2 0.139
(ns=84)
0.137
(ns=84)
0.149
(ns=80)
0.133
(ns=89)
0.137
(ns=89)
0.115
(ns=127)
0.119
(ns=128)
‖vnd‖2
‖vns‖2 0.705 0.664 0.591 0.662 0.679 0.783 0.790
1/
√
nd
1/
√
ns
0.417 0.400 0.399 0.418 0.432 0.518 0.554
Table 2: Estimates for ‖vn‖2 obtained from the U.S. input-output data at different levels of aggregation.
‖vnd‖2 denotes estimates obtained from the detailed level input-output BEA data. ‖vns‖2 denotes estimates
obtained from the summary input-output BEA data. The numbers in parentheses denote the total number
of sectors implied by each level of disaggregation.
The more important quantity, however, is the ratio ‖vnd‖2/‖vns‖2, which captures the change in
the aggregate effect of sectoral shocks as we go from more to less aggregated data. If indeed taking
intersectoral linkages into account simply doubles the impact of sectoral shocks at all levels of dis-
aggregation, then this ratio would be approximately equal to 1/
√
nd
1/
√
ns
. If, on the other hand, network
effects are more important at higher levels of disaggregation, then we would expect ‖vnd‖2/‖vns‖2
to be larger than 1/
√
nd
1/
√
ns
. Table 2 clearly shows that the latter is indeed the case for all years. For
example in 1972, as we move from the more aggregated measurement at the level of 84 sectors (at
2-digit SIC) to an economy comprising 483 sectors (roughly at 4-digit SIC), the standard diversi-
fication argument would imply a decline of 58% in the role of sectoral shocks, whereas the actual
decline observed in the data (measured by ‖vnd‖2/‖vns‖2) is about 29%. In fact, as we will show
next, the observed declines across all years are much more in line with the predictions of Corollary
2 rather than 1/
√
nd
1/
√
ns
implied by the standard diversification argument.
Our second approach is to extrapolate from the distributions of first-order and second-order
degrees in Figures 8 and 9 to infer the potential role of network effects at finer levels of disaggre-
gations than that provided by the BEA tables. Clearly, we only observe the input-output matrix
— the equivalent of matrix W in our model — at the levels of disaggregation available through
the BEA tables. Therefore, such extrapolations are inevitably speculative. Nevertheless, the “scale-
free” nature of the power law distribution, which appears to be a good approximation to the data,
suggests that the tail behavior of first-order and second-order degrees may be informative about
their behavior at higher levels of disaggregation.
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As suggested by the discussion following Corollary 2, the estimates in Table 1 imply that the
lower bound on the rate of decay of standard deviation obtained from the second-order degrees
is considerably tighter than that obtained from the first-order degrees. In particular, the shape
parameter ζ̂ = 1.18 implies that aggregate volatility decays no faster than n(ζ−1)/ζ = n0.15, whereas
the lower bound implied by the average shape parameter for the first-order degrees, β̂ = 1.38, is
n(β−1)/β = n0.28. It is noteworthy that this is not only a significantly slower rate of decay than
√
n
— the rate predicted by the standard diversification argument — but is also consistent with the
declines in ‖vn‖2 as we go from less to more disaggregated data in Table 2.
To gain a further understanding of the implications of this differential rate of decay (due to
network effects and the hypothesized scale-free behavior of second-order degrees), we computed
the (over-time) average standard deviation of total factor productivity across 459 four-digit (SIC)
manufacturing industries from the NBER productivity database between 1958 and 2005 (after con-
trolling for a linear time trend to account for the secular decline in several manufacturing indus-
tries).27 This average standard deviation is estimated as 0.058.28 On the other hand, over the
same time period, the average of the U.S. GDP accounted for by manufacturing is around 20%.29
Thus if, for the purpose of our back-of-the-envelope calculations, we assume that the 459 four-
digit manufacturing sectors correspond to 1/5th of the GDP, we can consider that the economy
comprises 5 × 459 = 2295 sectors at the same level of disaggregation as four-digit manufactur-
ing industries.30 With a sectoral volatility of 0.06, if aggregate volatility decayed at the rate
√
n,
as would have been the case with a balanced structure, we would expect it to be approximately
around 0.058/
√
2295 ' 0.001; clearly corresponding to a very small amount of variability. This
observation underscores the fact that in a balanced structure with a reasonably large number of
sectors, sector-specific shocks average out and do not translate into a sizable amount of aggregate
volatility. If, instead, as suggested by our lower bound from the second-order degree distribution,
aggregate volatility decays at the rate n0.15, the same number would be 0.058/(2295)0.15 ' 0.018.
This corresponds to sizable aggregate fluctuations, in the ballpark of the approximately 2% stan-
dard deviation of the U.S. GDP.
This extrapolation exercise thus suggests that the types of interconnections implied by the U.S.
input-output structure may generate significant aggregate fluctuations from sectoral shocks. Note
that — as we have already emphasized — these calculations are merely suggestive and are no
27To the extent that total factor productivity is measured correctly, it approximates the variability of idiosyncratic
sectoral shocks. In contrast, the variability of sectoral value added is determined by idiosyncratic shocks as well as the
sectoral linkages, as we emphasized throughout the paper.
28Alternatively, if we weigh different industries by the logarithm of their value added so that small industries do not
receive disproportionate weights, the average becomes 0.054.
29Data from http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind data.htm.
30One might be concerned that manufacturing is more volatile than non-manufacturing. This does not appear to be
the case, however, at the three-digit level, where we can compare manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. If
anything, manufacturing industries appear to be somewhat less volatile with or without controlling for industry size
(though this difference is not statistically significant in either case).
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substitute for a systematic econometric and quantitative investigation of the implications of the
input-output linkages in the U.S. economy, which we leave for future work.
5 Conclusion
The general consensus in macroeconomics has been that microeconomic shocks to firms or disag-
gregated sectors cannot generate significant aggregate fluctuations. This consensus, based on a
“diversification argument,” has maintained that such “idiosyncratic” shocks would wash out as
aggregate output concentrates around its mean at the very rapid rate of
√
n.
This paper illustrates that in the presence of intersectoral input-output linkages, such a diversi-
fication argument may not apply. Rather, propagation of microeconomic idiosyncratic shocks due
to the intersectoral linkages may indeed lead to aggregate fluctuations. In particular, the rate at
which aggregate volatility decays explicitly depends on the structure of the intersectoral network
representing input-output linkages. Our results provide a characterization of this relationship in
terms of the importance of different sectors as direct or indirect suppliers to the rest of the econ-
omy; in particular, high levels of variability in the degrees of different sectors (as captured by the
corresponding coefficient of variation) as well as the presence of high degree sectors that share
common suppliers (as measured by the second-order interconnectivity coefficient) imply slower
rates of decay for aggregate volatility.
The main insight suggested by this paper is that sizable aggregate fluctuations may originate
from microeconomic shocks only if there are significant asymmetries in the roles that sectors play
as direct or indirect suppliers to others. This analysis provides a fairly complete answer to the
debate between Dupor (1999) and Horvath (1998, 2000). It shows that while Dupor’s critique
applies to economies with balanced structures, in general the sectoral structure of the economy
may have a defining impact on aggregate fluctuations.
Our analysis suggests a number of directions for future research. First, a more systematic
analysis to investigate the quantitative importance of the mechanisms stressed in this paper is
required. In this vein, Carvalho (2008) extends our characterization to the class of dynamic mul-
tisector economies considered by Long and Plosser (1983) and Horvath (2000), and conducts a
detailed calibration exercise to show that the intersectoral network structure can account for a
large fraction of observed sectoral comovement and aggregate volatility of the U.S. economy. Such
an investigation can be complemented by systematic econometric analyses that build on Foerster,
Sarte, and Watson (2011) and exploit both the time-series and cross-sectoral implications of the
approach developed here.
Second, the characterization results provided here focus on the standard deviation of log value
added, which captures the nature of fluctuations “near the mean” of aggregate output. This can
be supplemented by a systematic analysis of large deviations of output from its mean. Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2010) provide a first set of results relating the likelihood of tail events
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to the structural properties of the intersectoral network.
Third, throughout the paper we assumed that the intersectoral network captures the exogenously-
given technological constraints of different sectors. In practice, however, input-output linkages
between different firms and disaggregated sectors are endogenously determined. For example, by
making costly investments in building relationships with several suppliers, firms may be able to
reduce their inputs’ volatilities, creating a trade-off. Part of this trade-off will be shaped by how
risky different suppliers are perceived to be and how risk is evaluated and priced in the economy.
Characterizing the implications of such trade-offs is an important direction for future research.
Last but not least, another important area for future research is a systematic analysis of the
relationship between the structure of financial networks and the extent of contagion and cascading
failures (see e.g., Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012)).
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Appendix A: Competitive Equilibrium
Definition. A competitive equilibrium of economy E with n sectors consists of prices (p1, p2, . . . , pn),
wage h, consumption bundle (c1, c2, . . . , cn), and quantities (`i, xi, (xij)) such that
(a) the representative consumer maximizes her utility,
(b) the representative firms in each sector maximize profits,
(c) labor and commodity markets clear, i.e.,
ci +
n∑
j=1
xji = xi ∀i = 1, . . . , n,
n∑
i=1
`i = 1.
Taking first-order conditions with respect to `i and xij in firm i’s problem implies `i = αpixi/h
and xij = (1 − α)piwijxi/pj , where h is the market wage and pj denotes the price of good j.
Substituting these values in firm i’s production technology yields
α log(h) = αi +B + log(pi)− (1− α)
n∑
j=1
wij log(pj) + (1− α)
n∑
j=1
wij log(wij),
where B is a constant given by B = α log(α) + (1− α) log(1− α). Multiplying the above equation
by the i-th element of the influence vector v′ = αn1
′[I − (1− α)W ]−1 and summing over all sectors
i gives
log(h) = v′+ µ
where µ is a constant independent of the vector of shocks  and is given by
µ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
log(pi) +B/α+
1− α
α
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
viwij log(wij).
Finally, by setting
A = n exp
−B/α− (1− α)
α
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
viwij log(wij)
 (12)
and normalizing the ideal price index to 1, i.e., nA(p1p2 . . . pn)
1/n = 1, we obtain
y = log(h) = v′.
That is, the logarithm of real value added in a given economy — which we refer to as aggregate
output — is simply a weighted sum of sector-specific productivity shocks, where the weights are
determined by the corresponding influence vector.
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We now show that the influence vector also captures the equilibrium share of sales of dif-
ferent sectors. By plugging in consumption levels and firms’ labor and input demands into the
market clearing condition for commodity i, we obtain h/n + (1 − α)∑nj=1wjipjxj = pixi. This
implies that si = h/n + (1 − α)
∑n
j=1 sjwji, where si = pixi is the equilibrium value of sales
of sector i. Thus, the vector of equilibrium sales is related to the influence vector through s′ =
(h/n)1′ [I − (1− α)W ]−1 = (h/α)v′. Therefore,
vi =
pixi∑n
j=1 pjxj
,
where we have used the fact that v′n1 = 1.
The relationship between equilibirum shares of sales of different sectors and the influence vec-
tor can also be derived directly by applying a variant of Hulten (1978)’s theorem, which establishes
that if the production functions are given by xi = eαif(xi1, . . . , xin, `i), a productivity change of
d(αi) to sector i causes an increase in GDP equal to
d(GDP) =
pixi
GDP
d(αi).
Finally, the fact that h = α
∑n
i=1 pixi implies
vi =
dh
di
=
pixi∑n
j=1 pjxj
.
Appendix B: Central Limit Theorems
The Lindeberg-Feller Theorem
The Lindeberg-Feller Theorem (Durrett (2005, p. 114)) provides sufficient conditions under which
the distribution of sums of independent, but not necessarily identically distributed random vari-
ables converges to the normal law.
Theorem A. 1 (Lindeberg-Feller). Consider the triangular array of independent random variables ξin,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, with zero expectations and finite variances such that
n∑
i=1
Eξ2in = 1.
Also suppose that Lindeberg’s condition holds, i.e.,
lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
E
(
ξ2inI{|ξin|>δ}
)
= 0 for all δ > 0, (13)
where I denotes the indicator function. Then,
ξ1n + ξ2n + · · ·+ ξnn d−→ N (0, 1).
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Non-Classical Central Limit Theorems
To establish asymptotic normality for triangular arrays of random variables {ξin} that do not sat-
isfy Lindeberg’s condition (13), one needs to apply “non-classical” generalizations of the central
limit theorem. The following theorem is from Rotar (1975). A detailed treatment of the subject can
be found in Chapter 9 of Linnik and Ostrovskiı˘ (1977).
Theorem A.2. Consider a triangular array of independent random variables ξin, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, with distribu-
tions Gin, zero expectations, and finite variances σ2in, such that
∑n
i=1 σ
2
in = 1. Then
∑n
i=1 ξin −→ N (0, 1)
in distribution, only if
lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
∫
|t|>δ
|t| |Gin(t)− Φin(t)| dt = 0 for all δ > 0, (14)
where Φin(t) = Φ(t/σin) and Φ denotes the standard normal distribution.
Appendix C: Proofs
Throughout the proofs, for notational simplicity, we drop the index n when denoting the degrees
of different sectors and the elements of matrix Wn if no confusion arises.
Before presenting the proof of Theorem 1, we state and prove a simple lemma.
Lemma A.3. If {in} satisfy the assumptions of part (b) of Theorem 1, then for any constant b > a,
E
[
2inI{|in|>b}
]
< E
[
2I{||>b}
]
.
Proof: First note that a simple application of integration by parts implies
E
[
2inI{in>b}
]
=
∫ ∞
b
t2dFin(t)
= b2[1− Fin(b)] + 2
∫ ∞
b
t[1− Fin(t)]dt
< b2[1− F¯ (b)] + 2
∫ ∞
b
t[1− F¯ (t)]dt
= E
[
2I{>b}
]
,
where the inequality in the third line is a consequence of the fact that Fin(t) > F¯ (t) for all t > a.
Also note that the second equality relies on the fact that limt→∞ t2[1−F¯ (t)] = 0, itself a consequence
of the assumption that ¯ has a bounded variance. A similar argument guarantees
E
[
2inI{in<−b}
]
< E
[
2I{<−b}
]
,
completing the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 1: The proof of part (a) is trivial and is omitted.
In order to prove part (b), define the triangular array of real numbers {ξin}1≤i≤n as ξin =
vinin/σ‖vn‖2, which implies 1σ‖vn‖2 yn = ξ1n+ · · ·+ξnn. It is straightforward to verify that Eξin = 0
and
∑n
i=1 Eξ2in = 1. Therefore, provided that Lindeberg’s condition (13) is satisfied, the Lindeberg-
Feller Theorem implies that yn/σ‖vn‖2 converges in distribution to a standard normal distribution.
In order to verify that Lindeberg’s condition indeed holds, notice that for large enough values of
n, we have
n∑
i=1
E
(
ξ2inI{|ξin|>δ}
)
=
1
σ2‖vn‖22
n∑
i=1
v2in E
[
2inI{|in|> δσ‖vn‖2|vin| }
]
≤ 1
σ2‖vn‖22
n∑
i=1
v2in E
[
2inI{|in|> δσ‖vn‖2‖vn‖∞ }
]
<
1
σ2‖vn‖22
n∑
i=1
v2in E
[
2I{||> δσ‖vn‖2‖vn‖∞ }
]
=
1
σ2
E
[
2I{||> δσ‖vn‖2‖vn‖∞ }
]
,
where the second inequality is a consequence of Lemma A.3. By the dominated convergence the-
orem and the assumption that ‖vn‖∞ = o(‖vn‖2), the right-hand side of the above equality con-
verges to zero as n→∞, and therefore,
lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
E
(
ξ2inI{|ξin|>δ}
)
= 0 for all δ > 0;
completing the proof of part (b).
Finally, in order to prove part (c), we show that the triangular array of random variables ξin =
invin/σ‖vn‖2 does not satisfy condition (14).31 The distribution function of ξin is given byGin(t) =
F (tσ‖vn‖2/vin), where F denotes the distribution of in. Therefore,
n∑
i=1
∫
|t|>δ
|t| |Gin(t)− Φin(t)| dt = 1
σ2‖vn‖22
n∑
i=1
v2in
∫ ∞
−∞
|s| |F (s)− Φ(s)| I{|s|> δσ‖vn‖2|vin| }ds
≥
( ‖vn‖∞
σ‖vn‖2
)2 ∫ ∞
−∞
|s||F (s)− Φ(s)|I{|s|> δσ‖vn‖2‖vn‖∞ }ds.
Therefore, unless F = Φ, for small enough δ > 0, the right-hand side of the above relation is
bounded away from zero for infinitely many n. Hence, Theorem A.2 implies that 1‖vn‖2 yn is not
normally distributed as n→∞.
Proof of Theorem 2: Recall that aggregate volatility is of order ‖vn‖2. On the other hand, the fact
31For a similar argument, see Christopeit and Werner (2001).
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that all eigenvalues of (1−α)Wn lie strictly inside the unit circle means that vn can be expressed in
terms of the convergent power series
v′n =
α
n
1′
∞∑
k=0
[(1− α)Wn]k , (15)
implying
v′n ≥
α
n
1′ +
α(1− α)
n
1′Wn.
Therefore,
‖vn‖22 ≥
α2
n2
1′1 +
2α2(1− α)
n2
1′Wn1 +
α2(1− α)2
n2
‖W ′n1‖22
=
α2(3− 2α)
n
+
α2(1− α)2
n2
‖W ′n1‖22
= Θ (1/n) + Θ
(
1
n2
n∑
i=1
d2i
)
, (16)
where we have used the fact that the i-th column sum of Wn is the outdegree of sector i, and
that the sum of all its elements is equal to n. Given that inequality
√
n‖z‖2 ≥ ‖z‖1 holds for any
n-dimensional vector z, we conclude that
n∑
i=1
d2i ≥
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
di
)2
= n.
Thus, the first term in (16) is always dominated by the second term. This establishes the first part
of the theorem.
To prove the second part of the theorem, note that average outdegree d¯ is equal to one. There-
fore,
1
n2
n∑
i=1
d2i =
n− 1
n2
[CVn]
2 +
1
n
,
establishing that var(yn) = Ω
(
1+(CVn)2
n
)
. This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1: Define
Pˆn(k) ≡ 1
n
∣∣{i ∈ In : d2i > k}∣∣
as the empirical counter-cumulative distribution function of the outdegrees-squared. By defini-
tion, Pˆn(k) = Pn(
√
k) for all k. Also defineB = {b1, . . . , bm} as the set of values that the outdegrees-
squared of En take, where bk+1 > bk for all k. Thus,
n∑
i=1
d2i = n
m∑
k=1
bk
[
Pˆn(bk−1)− Pˆn(bk)
]
= n
m−1∑
k=0
(bk+1 − bk) Pˆn(bk)
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with the convention that b0 = 0. Therefore,
n∑
i=1
d2i = n
∫ bm
0
Pˆn(t)dt = 2n
∫ dnmax
0
tPn(t)dt
where the last equality is due to a simple change of variables. The assumption that L(·) is a slowly-
varying function, satisfying limt→∞ L(t)tδ =∞ for any positive δ > 0, implies that
n∑
i=1
d2i ≥ ncˆn
∫ dnmax
0
t(1−β−δ)dt,
where cˆn = Θ(1) is a sequence of positive numbers. Thus, from (7) in Theorem 2 and since β ∈
(1, 2), we have
(var yn)
1/2 = Ω
(
n
1−β
β
−δ′)
,
where δ′ = δ/(2β).
Proof of Theorem 3: Recall that the influence vector corresponding to economy En can be writ-
ten in terms of a power series of Wn specified by (15). Given the fact that all terms in this infinite
sum are non-negative vectors, we have
v′n ≥
α
n
1′
[
I + (1− α)Wn + (1− α)2(Wn)2
]
.
Therefore,
‖vn‖22 ≥
α2
n2
1′
[
I + (1− α)Wn + (1− α)2(Wn)2
][
I + (1− α)Wn + (1− α)2(Wn)2
]′
1
= Θ
(
1
n2
‖1′Wn‖22
)
+ Θ
(
1
n2
1′(Wn)2W ′n1
)
+ Θ
(
1
n2
∥∥1′(Wn)2∥∥22) , (17)
where we have used the fact that 1
n2
‖1′Wn‖22 = 1n2
∑n
i=1 d
2
i dominates 1/n for large values of n. For
the second term on the right-hand side of (17), we have
1′(Wn)2W ′n1 =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
wjididj
=
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
wjididj +
n∑
i=1
wiid
2
i
= s(Wn) +O
(
n∑
i=1
d2i
)
,
where s(Wn) ≡
∑n
i=1
∑
j 6=iwjididj is known as the s-metric of the corresponding intersectoral
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network. On the other hand, for the third term on the right-hand side of (17), we have
∥∥1′(Wn)2∥∥22 = n∑
i=1
 n∑
j=1
wjidj
2 = n∑
i=1
wiidi +∑
j 6=i
wjidj
2
=
n∑
i=1
w2iid
2
i + 2
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
wiiwjididj +
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
wjidj
2
= O
(
n∑
i=1
d2i
)
+O (s(Wn)) +
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
d2jw
2
ji +
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
∑
k 6=i,j
wjiwkidjdk
= O
(
n∑
i=1
d2i
)
+O (s(Wn)) + Θ (τ2(Wn))
where in the next to the last equality we used the fact that wii ≤ 1 for all i. The last equality holds
because of the fact that
∑n
i=1w
2
ji ≤ 1 for all j. Thus, combining all the above leads to
‖vn‖22 = Ω
(
1
n2
[
n∑
i=1
d2i + s(Wn) + τ2(Wn)
])
.
Now, inequality
n∑
i=1
di −∑
j 6=i
wjidj
2 ≥ 0
guarantees that
n∑
i=1
d2i +
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
d2jw
2
ji + τ2(Wn) ≥ 2s(Wn)
implying that s(Wn) = O
(∑n
i=1 d
2
i + τ2(Wn)
)
. Therefore, in highly disaggregated economies, the
effect captured by the s-metric is dominated by the sum of the other two terms, and as a result
‖vn‖2 = Ω
 1
n
√√√√ n∑
i=1
d2i +
√
τ2(Wn)
n
 ,
completing the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2: By equation (17), we have (var yn)1/2 = Ω
(
1
n‖1′(Wn)2‖2
)
, which implies
that
(var yn)
1/2 = Ω
 1
n
√√√√ n∑
i=1
q2i
 .
The rest of the proof follows from an argument similar to the proof of Corollary 1.
Proof of Theorem 4: First, note that ‖vn‖2 = Ω(1/
√
n) for any sequence of economies. On the
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other hand, for a balanced sequence of economies, we have ‖Wn‖1 = maxi∈In di = Θ(1). There-
fore, rearranging equation (4) to
v′n =
α
n
1′ + (1− α)v′nWn,
implies that
‖vn‖∞ ≤ α
n
+ (1− α)‖Wn‖1‖vn‖∞ ≤ α
n
+ C(1− α)‖vn‖∞.
where C is a constant independent of n. Thus, for α > (C − 1)/C,
‖vn‖∞ ≤ α
n
[
1− (1− α)C]−1,
guaranteeing that ‖vn‖∞ = O(1/n). Finally, Ho¨lder’s inequality, ‖vn‖2 ≤
√‖vn‖1‖vn‖∞, and the
fact that ‖vn‖1 = 1 imply that ‖vn‖2 = O(1/
√
n), completing the proof.
Appendix D: Higher-Order Interconnections
As mentioned in Section 3.4, the results on second-order interconnections can be extended even
further in order to capture more complex patterns of cascades due to higher-order interconnectiv-
ities in the intersectoral network. Mathematically, these correspond to tighter lower bounds than
the one we provided in Theorem 3.
Definition. Given an economy En = (In,Wn, {Fin}i∈In), the (m+ 1)th-order interconnectivity coeffi-
cient is defined as
τm+1(Wn) ≡
n∑
i=1
∑
j1,...,jm
k1,...,km
all distinct
(
dnj1d
n
k1
) (
wnjmiw
n
kmi
)m−1∏
s=1
wnjsjs+1
m−1∏
r=1
wnjrjr+1
This coefficient captures input-output relations between different sectors of order m + 1. For
example, the third-order coefficient is high when the suppliers of high-degree sectors share com-
mon suppliers. As in the case of second-order interconnectivity coefficient, the Rearrangement
Inequality implies that higher levels of τm correspond to higher interconnectivities among differ-
ent sectors. In particular, we have the following generalization of Theorem 3.
Theorem A.4. Consider a sequence of economies {En}n∈N. Then for any integerm ≥ 2, aggregate volatility
satisfies
(var yn)
1/2 = Ω
(
1√
n
+
CVn√
n
+
√
τ2(Wn)
n
+ · · ·+
√
τm(Wn)
n
)
.
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The proof follows a logic identical to the proof of Theorem 3. In particular, it is easy to verify
that for any integer m ≥ 2, the influence vector satisfies the following inequality; a consequence of
equation (15):
vn ≥ α
n
m∑
k=0
(1− α)k1′ (Wn)k ,
leading to the following lower bound for the Euclidean norm of the influence vector:
‖vn‖22 ≥
α2
n2
m∑
k=1
(1− α)2k1′ (Wn)k
(
W ′n
)k
1.
Writing the matrix powers in terms of the input-output weights, and upon some simplification
and rearrangement of terms, we obtain the result.
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